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countries facing severe economic and financial 
difficulties. As Grabbe (2012) pointed out, the 
sovereign debt crisis is more than the breakdown 
of both a currency and a political project, as it is 
also causing a loss of trust between EU Member 
States.
By taking Germany and Italy as illustrative exam-
ples of this “Core-Periphery” divide, this article 
aims to investigate the evolution of public support 
for the EU in these two countries, both before 
and after the Euro crisis, and its relation with the 
mutual perceptions of both countries as expressed 
by public opinion and the political élites. I postu-
late that, given the leading role played by Germany 
within the EU institution and the different narra-
tives fuelled in the core and peripheral Member 
States, Italian citizens and representatives tend to 
blame Germany both for the Euro crisis and for 
the bad Italian economic situation. Therefore, we 
expect to find a significant association between the 
orientations of Italians towards the EU and their 
view of Germany. Empirical analyses have been 
conducted using cross-sectional survey data at 
both the mass and élite levels taken from multiple 
sources. The findings obtained confirm our expec-
tations.
Political Commonalities but 
Long-lasting Stereotypes
Germany and Italy share numerous historical 
commonalities, such as a late nation-building 
process which occurred only in the second half 
of the nineteenth century, and the experience of 
authoritarian regimes during the two world wars. 
Germany and Italy are both founding members 
of the EU and, since the end of WWII have been 
characterised by a pronounced Europeanism by 
both their political élites and citizens. Moreover, 
both countries have undergone major political 
changes after the end of the Cold War: the re-unifi-
cation of West and East Germany following the 
tearing down of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and the 
collapse of the traditional party system in Italy, 
following the Mani Pulite corruption scandal(s) 
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Mutual trust among citizens of different EU 
Member States is a cornerstone for the estab-
lishment of a sense of European identity and 
the strengthening of the EU integration process 
(Hooghe and Verhaegen 2017). However, the 
current multifaceted crisis that the EU is expe-
riencing and some side effects of the integration 
process have not only exacerbated public opposi-
tion to the EU, but are also eroding the stock of 
mutual trust among the citizens of the different 
Member States that was accumulated after the end 
of the Second World War. In particular, the recent 
Eurozone crisis has increased the tension between 
core countries of Northern Europe, with strong 
macro-economic performances, and countries of 
the Southern periphery, struggling with excessive 
deficits and increasing public debt. Two competing 
narratives about who is to blame for the crisis are 
at play. The core countries’ narrative is about feck-
less Greeks and Italians and the inability of their 
national institutions to adopt structural reforms to 
keep their public debt under control and thereby 
render the Euro sustainable. The narrative running 
in peripheral Member States blame the Northern 
countries, Germany in primis, for their austerity 
measures and their lack of solidarity towards 
113  This article has been presented at the workshop “Re-
sponses of European Economic Cultures to Europe’s Crisis 
Politics: The Example of German-Italian Discrepancies” held 
in Villa Vigoni, Menaggio (IT) on 25 – 27 June 2018. The 
present contribution is mostly taken by Olmastroni, Francesco 
and Alessandro Pellegata (2018) “Members Apart: A Mass-
Elite Comparison of Mutual Perceptions and Support for the 
European Union in Germany and Italy”, Contemporary Italian 
Politics 10 (1): 56-75. This study received the financial support 
of the project “Reconciling Economic and Social Europe: The 
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In Germany, the debate over the Euro crisis has 
been framed as a conflict between “Northern 
saints” and “Southern sinners” (Matthijs and 
McNamara 2015). Hard work, prudent savings, 
moderate consumption, wage restraint, and 
fiscal stability – primarily in Germany, but also 
in Austria, Finland and The Netherlands – were 
seen as northern virtues and were juxtaposed to 
the southern vices of low competitiveness, meagre 
savings, disproportionate consumption, inflated 
wages, and fiscal profligacy which characterised 
the offensive acronym of “PIIGS” (the countries of 
Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spain). There-
fore, Germany supports a markedly “discipli-
narian” approach, deeply rooted in the ordoliberal 
doctrine (Bulmer 2014; Meiers 2015), according 
to which the burdens of fiscal adjustment should 
fall exclusively on national governments and 
taxpayers.
In contrast, a large part of the Italian media and of 
the political élite, even among mainstream polit-
ical parties, blame the excessive rigour and lack 
of solidarity of the EU institutions and northern 
governments, Germany in primis, and advance the 
notion of debt pooling in the form of Eurobonds 
or fiscal equalisation schemes. They oppose the 
conditionality regime and austerity measures, and 
call for more flexibility in the application of rules, 
the mobilisation of EU resources for investment 
and growth, and, most importantly, the “mutu-
alisation” of risks (Ferrera 2017). The REScEU 
(Reconciling Economic and Social Europe: Values, 
Ideas and Politics) Mass Survey provides evidence 
in support of the difference between the Germans’ 
and the Italians’ approval of financial bailouts, and 
their views about who is to blame for the recent 
Eurozone crisis (Ferrera and Pellegata 2017).
Previous research has shown a positive relation 
between support for the EU and macroeconomic 
performance (Anderson 1998; Anderson and 
Kaltenhaler 1996). Considering that the economic 
crisis, fiscal austerity measures and the condi-
tionality regime have produced clear and tangible 
losses in the Euro periphery, we expect to find a 
sharper decrease in public support for the EU in 
in the 1990s. Italian-German relations are intense 
and co-operative at the cultural, economic and 
societal level, as well as in daily political life. In 
2015, Italy ranked third among EU countries for 
the total value of German imports, and Germany 
is the biggest source of Italian imports and the first 
destination for Italian exports (Diedrichs 2010; 
Dinger 2013).
However, Germany and Italy have been also char-
acterised by longstanding stereotypes and preju-
dices. Germans express a high self-esteem and 
consideration of their leading role in Europe, 
and, while they admire Italy for its lifestyle, they 
consider its institutions to be inefficient and 
corrupt. On the other hand, Italians appreciate 
German efficiency and the hardworking ethic of its 
people but, at the same time, criticise their exces-
sive rigour and their harsh and uncompassionate 
nature. (Pew Research Center 2012, 2013; Frie-
drich Ebert Stiftung 2016). Gian Enrico Rusconi 
(2008), one of the most important scholars of 
Italian-German relations, argues that, since the 
end of the Cold War, several political events have 
represented sources of tension in Italian-German 
bilateral relations and have contributed to exacer-
bating the divergent views that the two countries 
have of each other.
Core versus Periphery: 
Germany-Italy Relations in 
Times of Crisis
With the outbreak of the Euro crisis, the EU and 
the integration process, which, for many years, 
had represented the common denominator of 
German-Italian bilateral relationships, have 
become the most challenging source of tension 
between these two countries. A new sharp dividing 
line over the issue of fiscal stability and, ultimately, 
cross-national solidarity has polarised German 
and Italian publics, their media and their political 
élites. Thus, two opposing narratives about who 
is to blame for the crisis and the initiatives that 
should be taken to manage its detrimental conse-
quences are in play.
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Figure 1. Public Mood towards the EU in 
Germany and Italy
Notes: Mood in the two countries has been estimated through 
the dyad ratio algorithm (WCalc software, Stimson 1999).
Source: Eurobarometer 1973-2016.
The green line in the graph plotted in Figure 1 
represents our estimate of the public mood of 
Italians towards the EU, while the red line indi-
cates that of the Germans towards the EU. This 
indicator should be interpreted as the annual 
share of citizens who express “pro-EU” stances. 
The average level of public mood towards the EU 
is quite high in both Germany (65.7%) and Italy 
(70.0%), confirming the marked Europeanism 
that has characterised the two countries from the 
beginning of the EU project. However, the two 
countries show different patterns of variation over 
time. The public mood of the Germans towards 
the EU remained high and fairly constant during 
the 1970s and the 1980s. It decreased during the 
1990s, after the re-unification process and the 
decision to abandon the Deutschmark, but subse-
quently increased again to remain high even 
in recent years. As expected, the Italian mood, 
in contrast, relentlessly decreased from 1993, 
following the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty, 
and fell below the threshold of 50 per cent after 
the onset of the sovereign debt crisis. While, in 
2016, two Germans out of three expressed posi-
tive orientations towards the EU, only 37 per cent 
of Italians supported the integration process.
Italy than in Germany caused by the onset of the 
Eurozone crisis. However, we push our expecta-
tions a step forward by postu-
lating an association between 
support for the EU and the Ital-
ians’ view of Germany. The narra-
tives of both the media and the 
Italian political élite scapegoat 
EU institutions and their policy 
initiatives for the stagnant Italian 
economy and its excessive public 
debt. Given the strong relations 
that have occurred historically 
between Germany and Italy, and 
the leadership that the former 
plays within the EU institu-
tions (Paterson 2011; Kundnani 
2015), Italian citizens and its political élite tend 
to identify the EU behaviour with that of the role 
of Germany. Thus, we expect to find evidence in 
support of a decline in the level of trust of Ital-
ians vis-à-vis Germans relating to their decreasing 
support for the EU.
Assessing the Relation 
between Support for the EU 
and Mutual Feeling
A vast amount of the literature has argued that, 
from the early 1990s, the EU and the integration 
process started to be politicised in domestic poli-
tics, and became increasingly disputed after the 
onset of the financial crisis (Hooghe and Marks 
2009; Hutter, Grande and Kriesi 2016). In order 
to estimate the preferences of the Germans and 
the Italians for the EU, we have built a measure 
of public mood based upon several EU-related 
issues. This measure stems from the concept of 
policy mood developed by Stimson (1999), which 
is an aggregate and longitudinal estimation of the 
opinions of citizens on one or more controver-
sial policy issues. More precisely, we have aggre-
gated the frequency distributions of responses 
to survey questions related to general attitudes 
towards the EU gathered from Eurobarometer 
series conducted between 1973 and 2016.
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Figure 2. Germany-Italy mutual feelings. Mass 
(upper panel) and elite (lower panel) level
Then, to test our conjecture that the orientations 
of Italians towards the EU and their views about 
Germany are related, we have investigated empiri-
cally which individual-level factors are associated 
with the view of Germany expressed by Italian citi-
zens and their political representatives. Unfortu-
nately, as already observed, data on the reciprocal 
views of Germans and Italians do not system-
atically cover a long period. As a result, we have 
selected two partially different questions in order 
to operationalise Italian views of Germany in the 
last ten years taken from the Transatlantic Trends 
Survey and the LAPS-PRIN PEI survey.114 The first 
survey question asked respondents to evaluate 
their feelings towards Germany, its institutions, 
and people using either a 100-point or 10-point 
114  For Transatlantic Trends Survey, see http://www.gmfus.
org/initiatives/transatlantic-trends-%E2%80%93-public-opini-
on, and for LAPS PRIN_PEI data, see the Special issue “Italian 
Foreign Policy: To Take Arms against a Sea of Troubles?” of 
the Italian Political Science Review.
Unfortunately, we could not rely on a yearly esti-
mate of the reciprocal views of the Germans and 
the Italians to allow us to make a 
longitudinal description of their 
evolution. However, a number 
of recent surveys provide us 
with data that depict alarming 
signals regarding the mutual feel-
ings of the Germans and Ital-
ians. The Friedrich Ebert Foun-
dation (2016) shows impor-
tant differences in the opinions 
of the Germans and the Italians 
regarding the role of Germany 
within EU institutions. While 68 
per cent of the Italian respond-
ents agreed with the statement 
that Germany should contribute 
more to the EU budget since it 
receives more advantages than 
other Member States, 66 per cent 
of Germans took the opposite 
position. Furthermore, while an 
impressive 81 per cent of Italian 
respondents believe that Germany 
is abusing its power within the EU 
at the expense of other EU Member States, only 
19 per cent of their German counterparts agree on 
this position (see Figure 2). Few available data at 
the élite level confirm this discrepancy. A recent 
élite survey conducted by REScEU between 2017 
and 2018 among the national representatives of 
seven EU Member States, including Germany and 
Italy, asked the respondents to evaluate Germa-
ny’s political and diplomatic behaviour during the 
Euro crisis on a scale ranging from 0 (a self-inter-
ested hegemon) to 10 (a solidaristic leader). As the 
lower panel of Figure 2 indicates, the average value 
of German MPs is 5.7, while the average score 
among Italian MPs is 3.5.
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As expected, the lower the level of support for the 
EU expressed by Italian citizens and their polit-
ical élite, the lower their feeling towards Germany. 
This result is consistent, including a control for 
the impact of ideology, which is never signifi-
cantly related to Italians’ views of Germany. Not 
surprisingly, the negative association between 
the perceived threat of the economic recession 
for Italy/Europe and feeling towards Germany is 
significant only after the onset of the economic 
crisis. In contrast, the perceived cultural threat 
posed by immigration is never significantly asso-
ciated to the dependent variable. Finally, the nega-
tive evaluation of the influence exerted by Germany 
within the EU expressed by Italian public opinion 
and its élite is strongly associated with the negative 
feeling of Italians towards the former.
Note: -: negative and significant regression coefficient; n.s.: not 
significant regression coefficient.
Source: Transatlantic Trends Survey (2006; 2008; 2012); 
LAPS, PRIN-PEI (2016).
“thermometer” scale, with 100 (or 10) meaning a 
very warm, favourable feeling, 0 meaning a very 
cold, unfavourable feeling, and 50 (or 5) meaning 
not particularly warm nor cold. For the sake of 
consistency, we re-scaled the original values in 
order to obtain a 10-point scale. This survey item 
was available in 2006, 2008 and 2016. In 2012, 
we selected an item which presented a different 
wording. This item asked respondents whether 
they had a favourable or unfavourable opinion 
of Germany. We have recoded the original Likert 
scale, which included four response catego-
ries into a dummy variable: “tend not to favour” 
(0) and “tend to favour” (1). The main explana-
tory variables included in the regression models 
refer to individual perceptions of the economic 
and migration crises, the role of Germany and its 
leadership during and after the crisis, and their 
opinion of the EU and their country’s membership 
of the Eurozone.115 The results are controlled for 
the inclusion the ideological orientations, gender, 
age, and education of the respondents.116 Table 1 
summarises the main findings obtained in regres-
sion analyses.117
Table 1. Main Regression Results
115  Detailed information on the exact wording of different 
questions and their sources is provided in Olmastroni and Pel-
legata (2018) and its Online Appendix.
116  Because of the very low number of observations and in 
order to maximise the number of cases for each predictor, we 
have decided to omit controls from the regression models for 
political élites.
117 For a detailed presentation and discussion of all the 
regression results see Olmastroni and Pellegata (2018) and its 
Online Appendix.
Italian public opinion
View of Germany
2006 2008 2012 2016
Negative attitudes towards the EU - - - -
Economic downturn is a threat to Europe/Italy n.s. n.s. n.s. -
Immigration is a threat to Europe/Italy n.s. n.s.
Negative evaluation of Germany’s influence in Europe - -
Italian national MPs
View of Germany
2006 2008 2012 2016
Negative attitudes towards the EU - - - -
Economic downturn is a threat to Europe/Italy n.s. n.s.
Immigration is a threat to Europe/Italy n.s. n.s.
Negative evaluation of Germany’s influence in Europe -
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Conclusions
The empirical results that emerge from this study 
undoubtedly represent a serious challenge to 
the integration process. The multiple crises that 
Europe is recently experiencing and the policy 
initiatives implemented by the EU to address them 
have detrimental effects not only on support for 
the EU and its institutions, but also on the labori-
ously accumulated capital of respect and mutual 
trust among both the national governments and 
the citizens of the different Member States. In 
particular, Italian citizens and their political élite 
are likely to assimilate the EU and its behaviour 
with Germany’s “hegemonic” role within the EU 
institutions.
However, recent public opinion surveys also show 
that the EU is re-gaining confidence in the eyes 
of the citizens, and, more interestingly, that there 
is a broad support, even in core countries such as 
Germany, for policy initiatives aimed at strength-
ening pan-EU solidarity (Ferrera and Pellegata 
2017; PEW Research Center 2017). Many Euro-
pean citizens still believe in the EU, provided that 
the EU changes its course, carrying on solidarity-
enhancing measures to re-assure voters worried 
about the negative consequences of the integra-
tion process and the recent crises. Our results 
suggest that European leaders should follow this 
strategy with due diligence to avoid new losses of 
intra-European cohesion and the consequential 
damage to the stability, security and development 
of the EU community.
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